




To the Editor: In their article,
Collignon et al. (1) present a table
comparing absolute numbers and inci-
dence rates of Staphylococcus aureus
bacteremia (SAB) in Australia to
those of 5 other countries, and state
that “some data are available from
other countries for comparison” and
“only 2 countries, Denmark and
England, appeared to have compre-
hensive collection systems.” 
We would like to add data from the
European Antimicrobial Resistance
Surveillance System (EARSS) to their
table. EARSS is a multinational sur-
veillance system that links national
networks by collecting comparable
and validated data on the prevalence
of antimicrobial resistance of 5
microorganisms, including S. aureus
(2). A total of 30 countries participate
in EARSS. To ensure representative-
ness of the data it publishes, EARSS
has set criteria, which can be found
elsewhere (3). 
In 2003, through a questionnaire,
we collected background information
on all hospitals served by laboratories
participating in EARSS, including the
estimated hospitals’ catchment popu-
lations. Proportion of the country pop-
ulation covered by EARSS was then
calculated by dividing the sum of
catchment populations by the total
population of the country (4).
Catchment populations of hospitals
providing single specialty or supra-
regional type of care were not count-
ed to avoid overlap with other hospi-
tals within the same country. Only the
countries that provided denominator
data for at least 60% of the isolates
were included to ensure that the sam-
ple of hospitals was still representa-
tive of the country as a whole. 
The number of SAB and the inci-
dence of SAB per 100,000 inhabitants
in 2003 were calculated from EARSS
data, adjusted for population coverage,
and are presented in the Table. These
are crude estimates of the true number
of SAB and should, thus, be interpret-
ed with caution. For example, we
assumed that the isolates for which
hospital background information was
not available did not differ from iso-
lates for which we had this informa-
tion, and that hospitals that participat-
ed in EARSS in 2003 were a represen-
tative sample of the countries’ hospi-
tals. Additionally, the incidence of
SAB was positively correlated with
the blood culturing rate (Spearman r =
0.74, p = 0.002), which means that the
incidence of SAB is likely to have
been underestimated in countries that
reported few blood cultures. Although
some countries did not report their
blood culturing rate, the incidences of
SAB in these countries were among
the highest and are unlikely to be
underestimated. For example, the
EARSS data for Denmark and Ireland
nicely fitted those presented in Table 4
of the article by Collignon et al. (1).
Finally, reporting to the EARSS sys-
tem greatly improved over the years,
which is why this study was performed
on the last available year, 2003.
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Nevertheless, one cannot exclude
underreporting of SAB by EARSS par-
ticipating hospitals since EARSS is a
voluntary reporting system. For exam-
ple, England reported 18,403 SAB
cases or an incidence of 37 SAB per
100,000 inhabitants from April 2002 to
March 2003 through its mandatory
surveillance scheme (5), whereas an
estimate for the United Kingdom from
the EARSS database would only give
7,800 SAB cases for 2003. However, it
is impossible to determine whether this
discrepancy was due to poor voluntary
reporting of SAB cases, a lower blood
culturing rate in EARSS participating
hospitals, or a poorly representative
sample of the country’s hospitals. Data
from the United Kingdom were
excluded from the present study on the
basis of the latter possibility; denomi-
nator information for <60% of the iso-
lates was available. 
In conclusion, EARSS is the first
comprehensive surveillance system
on antimicrobial resistance in Europe.
Within certain limitations, EARSS
can also provide valuable information
on blood-culturing practices and the
incidence of SAB in Europe. The sys-
tem is continuously being improved,
and additional information on the rep-
resentativeness of EARSS data is
being collected. This will allow us to
improve the quality and accuracy of
the reported incidence rates. In the
future, the system should allow
reporting of similar data for an even
larger number of European countries
and for additional microorganisms,
such as Escherichia coli.
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Family Clustering
of Avian Influenza A
(H5N1)
To the Editor: The unprecedented
epizootic of avian influenza A(H5N1)
in Asia poses a serious threat of caus-
ing the next global influenza pandem-
ic. H5N1 viruses, to which humans
have little or no immunity, have
demonstrated the capacity to infect
humans and cause severe illness and
death (1–4). Fortunately, these viruses
have not yet demonstrated the capaci-
ty for efficient and sustained person-
to-person transmission, although lim-
ited person-to-person transmission
was the cause of at least 1 family clus-
ter of cases (5). Since family clusters
of H5N1 illness may be the first sug-
gestion of a viral or epidemiologic
change, we have been monitoring
them with great interest.
Through our regional contacts and
public sources, we have monitored
family clusters and other aspects of
H5N1 in Southeast Asia. A cluster
was defined as >2 family members
with laboratory-confirmed H5N1 or
>2 family members with severe pneu-
monia or respiratory death, at least
one of which had confirmed H5N1.
To determine if family cluster events
had increased over time, we divided
the number of cluster events by the
total number of days in 2 discrete
periods and calculated rate ratios
(RR) and 95% confidence intervals
(CI). To determine whether the
increase in family clustering was
attributable to an increase in the num-
ber of cases, we divided the number
of family units with >2 laboratory-
confirmed cases by the total number
of family units in the period.
Percentage of deaths was also com-
pared.
From January 2004 to July 2005,
109 cases of avian influenza A
(H5N1) were officially reported to the
World Health Organization (WHO)
(6). During this time, 15 family clus-
ters were identified (Table). Of the 11
(73%) clusters that occurred in
Vietnam, 7 were in northern Vietnam.
Cluster size ranged from 2 to 5 per-
sons, and 9 (60%) had >2 persons
with laboratory-confirmed H5N1.
Cluster 6 in Thailand was well docu-
mented and was likely the result of
limited person-to-person transmission
(5). For the other clusters, epidemio-
logic information was insufficient to
determine whether person-to-person
transmission occurred. In at least
3 clusters in Vietnam (Table; clusters
5, 7, and 11), >7 days occurred
between the onset of the first and the
next case, suggesting that simultane-
ous acquisition from a common
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